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Supplemental Jurisdiction Extended Over Claims
From Class Action Plaintiffs: Exxon Mobil
Corporation v. Allapattah Services, Inc.
CIviL LITIGATION - FEDERAL JURISDICTION - SUPPLEMENTAL
JURISDICTION - DIVERSITY JURISDICTION - CLASS ACTIONS -
COMPLEX LITIGATION - The Supreme Court of the United States
held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 grants the federal court supplemental
jurisdiction over claims in class action suits that do not meet the
amount in controversy requirement, provided that jurisdiction is
based on diversity of citizenship and there are no other jurisdic-
tional deficiencies.
Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S. Ct.
2611 (2005).
The respondents, Exxon service station dealers ("dealers"), were
certified as a class' in federal court despite the fact that certain
class members' claims did not exceed the minimum monetary
value required for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.2
Petitioner, Exxon Mobil Corporation ("Exxon") appealed the certi-
fication, claiming that the federal court lacked jurisdiction to hear
the claims that did not meet the diversity jurisdiction require-
ments.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari4 to decide the is-
5sue.
The case involved a fundamental contract dispute between
Exxon and its dealers.6 In 1982, Exxon began a program called
1. A class action is "[a] lawsuit in which the court authorizes a single person or a
small group of people to represent the interests of a larger group." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIoNARY 267 (8th ed. 2004). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
2. Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2615 (2005).
Section 1332(a)(1) provides that, "[the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $ 75,000, exclu-
sive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(1) (2005).
3. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2615. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
4. Certiorari is "[a]n extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion,
directing a lower court to deliver the record in the case for review." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIoNARY 241 (8th ed. 2004).
5. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2615.
6. Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corporation, 333 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir.
2003).
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"Discounts for Cash," which encouraged dealers to lower their gas
prices by several cents per gallon for customers who paid in cash.7
The dealers, in turn, would receive wholesale discounts from
Exxon if they had enough customers pay in cash.8 The program
carried on without conflict until the dealers noticed that Exxon
was charging a fee for credit card payments, instead of providing a
discount for cash payments.9
In May of 1991, the dealers filed a class action lawsuit against
Exxon in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Florida, with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. ' °
The district court affirmed the certification after a preliminary
hearing in which a magistrate judge recommended that the class
be certified under Rule 23(b)(3) 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 12 Exxon objected to the court's jurisdiction, claiming that,
because every class member's claim did not meet the requisite
amount in controversy, 3 federal jurisdiction was lacking. 4 The
district court, however, found that it had supplemental jurisdic-
tion over these additional claims based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367.15
7. Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 5452.
8. . Id.
9. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants at 11, Exxon Corporation v. Allapat-
tah Services, Inc., et. al., Nos. 01-15575-AA and 01-16244-AA (11th Cir. 2003).
10. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2615. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The dealers, approximately 10,000
current and former Exxon vendors from thirty-five different states, claimed that Exxon
breached its contractual duty to the class collectively when Exxon started penalizing credit
card payments instead of rewarding cash payments. Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 1252. The
complaint alleged that Exxon had reduced its wholesale price by 1.7 cents per gallon for a
period of time, but then stopped providing the reduction in May 1983 without telling the
dealers. Id. The dealers sought to recover the amount that they were allegedly over-
charged. Id.
11. Rule 23(b)(3) allows class certification if "[tihe court finds that the questions of law
or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
12. Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 1253.
13. Section 1332(a)(1) requires all claims to exceed $75,000 when federal jurisdiction is
based upon diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
14. Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 1252.
15. Id. at 1253. Section 1367(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) ... the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case
or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such sup-
plemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or interven-
tion of additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2005).
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In January of 2001, the case was tried, and the jury entered a
verdict in favor of the dealers. 6 Despite the verdict, the district
court judge believed there was substantial ground for difference of
opinion on the jurisdictional issue and, therefore, certified the
matter to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit for interlocutory review 17 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).18
One of the questions certified was whether the court properly ex-
ercised supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of class members
who did not meet the amount in controversy requirement.' 9
The Eleventh Circuit answered in the affirmative, finding that
the plain language of § 1367 allows a district court entertaining a
diversity class action suit to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over claims that do not meet the amount in controversy require-
ment.2 ° In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court called in to
question Zahn v. International Paper Co.,2 which held that each
plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement or be dismissed from the case.2 Due to
the discrepancy, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
the issue.23
16. Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 1252. The jury found Exxon liable for breach of contract
and for fraudulent concealment of the breach. Id.
17. An interlocutory review is "[a]n appeal that occurs before the trial court's final
ruling on the entire case." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 106 (8th ed. 2004).
18. Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 1252. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2005). The proper test for
interlocutory review is whether an "order involves a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b).
19. Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 1252-53. The interlocutory appeal also asked if it was
proper to enter judgment for the class representatives, but not for the class as a whole. Id.
The circuit court answered this question in the affirmative as well. Id. at 1253.
20. Id. at 1256. The circuit court decided:
Thus, we find that § 1367 clearly and unambiguously provides district courts
with the authority in diversity class actions to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion over the claims of class members who do not meet the minimum amount in
controversy as long as the district court has original jurisdiction over the
claims of at least one of the class representatives.
Id.
21. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
22. Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 1253 (quoting Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301).
23. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2615. This case was consolidated with Ortega, et. al. v. Star-
Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124 (1st Cir. 2004). Id. Ortega involved the same legal issue as
Exxon; however, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that supplemental jurisdic-
tion could not extend to plaintiffs whose claims did not meet the requisite amount in con-
troversy requirement, even if other plaintiffs' claims did. Ortega, 370 F.3d at 143.
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Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion of the Court.24 He
began by discussing the federal court's role in the judicial branch.25
He explained that federal district courts are courts of limited ju-
risdiction, as both the United States Constitution and the United
States Code limit the scope of cases that a district court may adju-
dicate.26 While the Constitution bequeaths federal courts with a
broad jurisdictional basis, the Code limits that power by providing
three primary methods for federal jurisdiction to attach: federal
question jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, and supplemental
jurisdiction. 7
Kennedy explained that 28 U.S.C. § 133128 requires the action to
arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States
for federal question jurisdiction to attach. Section 1332 requires
both that the action be between citizens of different states29 and
that the monetary value of each claim in the action exceed $75,000
for diversity jurisdiction to attach.3 ° Justice Kennedy went on to
discuss § 1367, which grants federal courts supplemental jurisdic-
tion.3'
The first sentence of § 1367(a) extends supplemental jurisdic-
tion over all claims that form part of the same case or controversy
as another claim that is properly before the court.12 The second
sentence of § 1367(a) states that supplemental jurisdiction will
extend over additional claims from additional parties who have
24. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2615. This was a 5-4 opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas were of the majority. Id.
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Breyer joined. Id. Justice Gins-
burg also filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Breyer joined.
Id.
25. Id. at 2616.
26. Id. at 2616-17 (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
27. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2617-19.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2005). "The district courts shall have original [federal question]
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." Id.
29. The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1332 as requiring complete diversity, mean-
ing that every plaintiff must be of a different citizenship than every defendant. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967). This is a statutory require-
ment, not a Constitutional requirement, however, as statutes such as the Interpleader Act
allow minimal diversity in certain situations. State Farm, 386 U.S. at 530-31. Minimal
diversity only requires one plaintiff to be of a different citizenship than one defendant. Id.
See Interpleader Act of 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2005).
30. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2617. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
31. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2619-20. Supplemental jurisdiction gives courts the power to
hear a claim that they do not have original jurisdiction over, but forms part of the same
case or controversy as a claim properly before the court. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
32. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2620. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
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joined33 or intervened34 in the action.35 Based on a plain language
reading of the statute,36 Justice Kennedy concluded that § 1367(a)
grants district courts supplemental jurisdiction over any claim, by
any party, so long as one claim that is part of the same case or
controversy is properly before the court.3"
Justice Kennedy then decided the specific issue of whether
original jurisdiction 8 is present in a diversity case where all plain-
tiffs do not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.39 He
concluded that original jurisdiction does exist, so long as complete
diversity exists and a single claim exceeds the amount in contro-
versy requirement." The majority went on to say that if original
jurisdiction attaches to one such claim, the Court has original ju-
risdiction over a civil action within the meaning of
§ 1367(a), thus allowing supplemental jurisdiction to attach to all
other claims that are part of the same case or controversy. 1
The majority came to the conclusion that, based on § 1367(a)
alone, the district court had original jurisdiction to hear each and
every dealer's claim against Exxon.42 Complete diversity existed
between the parties;43 therefore, original jurisdiction attached to
the dealers' claims that exceeded $75,000." Supplemental juris-
diction then attached to the dealers' claims that did not exceed
$75,000, as they were part of the same case or controversy.3
33. Joinder is "[t]he uniting of parties or claims in a single lawsuit." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 853 (8th ed. 2004).
34. An intervening party is "[olne who voluntarily enters a pending lawsuit because of
a personal stake in it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 840 (8th ed. 2004). See FED. R. CIV. P.
24.
35. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2620. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
36. A plain language reading constricts the court to the "statute's text in light of con-
text, structure, and related statutory provisions." Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2620. A plain lan-
guage reading does not take in to account legislative history or any other materials outside
of the statutory text. Id. at 2625.
37. Id. at 2620-21. There is no dispute that each and every plaintiffs claim arose from
the same "case or controversy." Id. at 2615.
38. Original jurisdiction is the threshold requirement for supplemental jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a). Original jurisdiction is conferred once at least one claim is sufficient to
grant the court subject matter jurisdiction. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Telecon-
cepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1094 (3d Cir. 1995).




43. The parties do not dispute that complete diversity existed under § 1332. Id. at
2615.
44. Id. at 2622. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
45. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2622. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
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The jurisdictional issue was not resolved, however, as the Court
then turned to § 1367(b) 46 to see if any exceptions applied to
§ 1367(a)'s broad jurisdictional grant.47 Justice Kennedy explained
that the first set of exceptions48 contained within § 1367(b) only
applied to claims by current plaintiffs against joined defendants;
therefore, they were of no consequence to the case at hand.49 How-
ever, § 1367(b)'s second set of exceptions applied, since they per-
tained to claims by joined plaintiffs against current defendants."0
But as Justice Kennedy explained, only claims by plaintiffs joined
under Rules 19 or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure fell
within the exception, and since the dealers were joined under Rule
23, the exception was inapplicable.5'
After a thorough analysis of § 1367, the Court decided that the
requirements of § 1367 are met in diversity cases when complete
diversity exists and one plaintiff in a class action meets the
amount in controversy requirement, thus impliedly overruling
previous Supreme Court cases that held otherwise, such as Zahn5
and Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.3
Before concluding the opinion, however, the majority addressed
the position taken by the dissent, that the legislative history of
§ 1367 should have been consulted before the statute was inter-
46. Section 1367(b) provides:
[Tihe district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction.., over claims by
plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24.. . or over
claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such
rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 or such rules, when
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent
with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
47. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2621. Before analyzing § 1367(b), the Court noted, "[i]f
§ 1367(a) were the sum total of the relevant statutory language, our holding would rest on
that language alone." Id.
48. The first set of exceptions contained within § 1367(b) state that "the district courts
shall not have supplemental jurisdiction.., over claims by plaintiffs against persons made
parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
49. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2621. This case involves claims from additional plaintiffs
against a current defendant. Id. at 2616.
50. Id. at 2621. The second set of exceptions contained within § 1367(b) states that "the
district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction... over claims by persons proposed
to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs
under Rule 24." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
51. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2621. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
52. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 300.
53. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2622; Clark v. Paul Gray Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939). Clark held
that every plaintiff must separately satisfy the amount in controversy requirement in cases
involving federal question jurisdiction. Clark, 306 U.S. at 590. This holding is no longer
applicable because there is currently not an amount in controversy requirement for federal
question cases. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2625.
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preted.54 Justice Kennedy disagreed, arguing that legislative his-
tory is an interpretative tool that should only be consulted when a
statute is ambiguous.55 Because the majority found the statute to
be unambiguous, Justice Kennedy decided that interpretative
tools, such as legislative history, were not required to determine
the meaning of § 1367.56 The Court noted that dependence on leg-
islative history is dangerous because legislative history is itself
often ambiguous, and resorting to it would encourage others to
manipulate such materials to affect the outcome of judicial deci-
sions. 
5 7
The Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh
Circuit,58 holding (1) when complete diversity exists and at least
one claim satisfies the amount in controversy requirement, the
courts shall have diversity jurisdiction over that action, and
(2) the courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims in the action that form part of the same case or contro-
versy, subject to the restrictions of § 1367, as interpreted by the
Court.
59
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joined, dissented
from the majority, claiming that the legislative history of § 1367
should have been referenced, as it indicated Congress's intent to
withhold supplemental jurisdiction over claims in a Rule 23 class
action that did not meet the amount in controversy requirement .
Justice Stevens began his argument by stating that the legislative
history of a congressional enactment should always be consulted
when applying a statute, whether or not the statutory language is
ambiguous.61 The dissent argued that courts should utilize as
much relevant legislative history as possible before applying a
statute, because it is the best evidence of the legislature's intent."
54. Exxon, 545 S. Ct. at 2625.
55. Id. at 2626.
56. Id. at 2625.
57. Id. at 2626-27.
58. Justice Kennedy also reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit for its decision in Ortega. Id. at 2628. The Ortega court denied jurisdiction to a
claim by a plaintiff joined under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because of
a failure to meet the amount of controversy requirement. Id. at 2615 (citing Ortega, 370
F.3d at 143).
59. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2620.
60. Id. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (citing Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50 (2004) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
62. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Summer 2006 735
Duquesne Law Review
Justice Stevens then turned to the legislative history of § 1367,
by means of a House Report63 that was adopted by both the House
of Representatives and the Senate.' In this House Report, the
drafters of the statute specifically stated that § 1367 was meant
neither to overrule Zahn, nor to change the jurisdictional re-
quirements of § 1332 in diversity-based class actions. 5 Justice
Stevens believed that this committee report showed the legisla-
ture's clear and unequivocal purpose for drafting § 1367.66
Justice Stevens argued that the majority should have given def-
erence to the legislative history of § 1367 so that the Court's hold-
ing would have complied with the legislature's intent. He stated
that congressmen draft committee reports along with statutes so
that the courts will consult them and that congressmen rely on
these reports when casting their votes.8 Justice Stevens would
not have conferred federal jurisdiction to the dealers because he
believed it was Congress' intent to deny the federal courts diver-
sity jurisdiction over those plaintiffs that fail to meet the amount
in controversy requirement.69
Justice Ginsburg also filed a dissenting opinion, with whom
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Breyer joined. ° In her dissent,
Justice Ginsburg provided a different interpretation of § 1367
than that of the majority.' She began by discussing the require-
ments of § 1332, noting that the statute requires both complete
diversity between adversaries and a requisite amount in contro-
versy of $75,000 for each claim. She went on to mention that the
Court has never allowed a class of plaintiffs to bypass the amount
in controversy requirement and that every claim must exceed the
requirement individually.' Justice Ginsburg concluded by argu-
63. House Judiciary Committee Report on the Judicial Improvements Act, H.R. REP.
No. 101-734, at 78 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6874.
64. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 78. "The section [§ 1367] is not intended to affect the
jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-only class actions, as those
requirements were interpreted prior to [1990]." Id. Further, the report specifically stated
that "[slubsection (b) [is meant to eliminate] Rule 23(a) plaintiff-intervenors to the same
extent as those sought to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19." Id.
66. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2630. Justice Stevens felt that the majority failed to make "any serious at-
tempts at ascertaining [Congress'] intent." Id.
68. Id. at 2628.
69. Id. at 2630.
70. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2631 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1), (2).
73. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Clark, 306 U.S. at 589).
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ing that original diversity jurisdiction requires every claim to in-
dividually satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, and
because such was lacking here, original jurisdiction never at-
tached.74 According to Justice Ginsburg, because the district court
never had original jurisdiction, it certainly did not have supple-
mental jurisdiction; therefore, the case should have been dis-
missed.75
Prior to this decision, the circuit courts, much like the court at
hand, were split as to whether a federal court could exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction over additional claims that did not satisfy
the amount in controversy requirement.76 While some courts in-
terpreted § 1367 to extend supplemental jurisdiction over such
claims, others determined that § 1367(b) specifically precluded
this exercise of power.77 This dispute stemmed from the history of
supplemental jurisdiction and its treatment in federal court.8
In Mine Workers v. Gibbs,79 the Supreme Court conferred sup-
plemental jurisdiction in federal court for the first time.0 Gibbs
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee, alleging that the conduct of his labor union,
United Mine Workers of America, violated both federal and state
law.8 The district court allowed the federal law claim to proceed
based on federal question jurisdiction, but refused to hear the
state law claim for lack of original jurisdiction.82
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and overruled the district
court's decision, creating what is now known as supplemental ju-
risdiction.83 The Gibbs Court held that a federal court has the
power to hear an additional claim over which it does not have
original jurisdiction, so long as the claim arises out of the same
49 84case or controversy" as another claim properly before the court.
74. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2640.
76. Id. at 2615 (majority opinion).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2617.
79. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
80. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
81. Id. at 724. Gibbs sought relief for alleged violations of section 303 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2005), and of the
common law of Tennessee. Id. at 718.
82. Id. at 725.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 728. Supplemental jurisdiction is based on the fact that district courts have
the Constitutional authority under U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, to hear the entire "case" or "con-
troversy" if a portion of the case or controversy is presently before the court. Id. at 725.
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The Supreme Court created a two-pronged test to determine
whether supplemental jurisdiction could attach.85  If the federal
court has (1) original jurisdiction over at least one claim in the
action and (2) the additional claim forms a part of the same case
or controversy as the original claim,86 supplemental jurisdiction
can attach. 87
Despite the broad holding in Gibbs, federal courts were still re-
luctant to authorize supplemental jurisdiction over claims by addi-
tional parties when doing so would be inconsistent with § 1332's
diversity jurisdiction requirements.88 Courts felt that the re-
quirements of § 1332 applied to all parties in an action; thus, if
one party was non-diverse or failed to claim the requisite amount
in controversy, the entire case must be dismissed for lack of origi-
nal jurisdiction and failure of the first prong of the Gibbs test.89
This rationale was soon tested in Zahn v. International Paper Co.9"
In Zahn, the plaintiffs, 200 lakefront property owners along
Lake Champlain in Vermont, were certified as a class under Rule
23(b)(3), and brought suit against the International Paper Com-
pany for allegedly polluting the lake and causing property dam-
age.91 Despite the fact that only several of the plaintiffs' claims
met the amount in controversy requirement, the class filed suit in
federal court, invoking the court's diversity jurisdiction.92  The
class was not allowed to proceed, however, as the district court
found that there was no jurisdictional basis for the claims of class
members who did not meet the minimum amount in controversy.
The Supreme Court upheld this decision, explaining that the
amount in controversy requirement applies to all plaintiffs, and if
one claim does not satisfy the requirement, all claims fail for lack
of original jurisdiction.94 The Court found that, since every plain-
85. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725-26.
86. Id. The proper test was whether the two claims derived from a "common nucleus of
operative fact." Id.
87. Id. at 725.
88. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2618.
89. Id.
90. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 291.
91. Id. at 291-92. "The claim of each of the named plaintiffs was found to satisfy the
$10,000 jurisdictional amount, but the District Court was convinced 'to a legal certainty'
that not every individual owner in the class had suffered pollution damages in excess of
$10,000." Id. at 292. The jurisdictional amount, also known as the amount-in-controversy
requirement, was $75,000 when Exxon was decided. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
92. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 292.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 294. "Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdic-
tional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the case - one plain-
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tiff must satisfy the diversity requirements individually, if one
plaintiff did not, original jurisdiction would be lost over all.9"
A similar result followed in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Kroger.9" Kroger, a citizen of Iowa, brought a wrongful death ac-
tion against her decedent husband's employer, Omaha Public
Power District, a Nebraska corporation.97 Omaha then joined
Owen Equipment & Erection Company as a third party defen-
dant.98 The suit was filed in the United States District Court for
the District of Nebraska, with jurisdiction based on diversity of
citizenship.99 The case was tried in the district court despite the
fact that Kroger was domiciled in Iowa and Owen was an Iowa
corporation. "o
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case,
holding that supplemental jurisdiction could not attach to Kroger's
claim against Owen, because each party in a diversity suit must
individually meet the requirements of § 1332 before the court has
original jurisdiction.' Despite the fact that Kroger's claim
against Omaha had a proper jurisdictional basis, and Kroger's
claim against Owen arose out of a "common nucleus of operative
fact," the Supreme Court found that Owen should not have par-
ticipated in the suit because the company destroyed complete di-
versity, a requirement that each party must individually satisfy.
0 2
Since incomplete diversity deprived the court of original jurisdic-
tion, supplemental jurisdiction could not have attached.
0 3
The holdings in Zahn and Owen followed the same basic princi-
ple.' In Zahn, the Court would not extend supplemental jurisdic-
tion over claims from additional plaintiffs that did not meet
tiff may not ride in on another's coattails." Id. at 302 (citing Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S.
332, 343 (1969)).
95. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301.
96. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
97. Owen, 437 U.S. at 366.
98. Id. at 367-68. Rule 14 allows for such a practice:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-
party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a per-
son not a party to the action who is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff
for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the third party plaintiff.
FED. R. CIV. P. 14.
99. Owen, 437 U.S. at 367.
100. Id. at 369. Kroger eventually amended her complaint to include Owen as a first
party defendant as well. Id. at 366.
101. Id. at 367.
102. Id. at 378.
103. Id.
104. Owen, 437 U.S. at 372.
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§ 1332's requirements."5 In Owen, supplemental jurisdiction was
not extended to a claim that was against an additional defendant
who did not meet § 1332's requirements.' Following these deci-
sions, the state of the law was clear: supplemental jurisdiction
was not to attach to claims from or against parties that did not
first meet the requirements of § 1332.107
Consistent with these decisions, the legislature purported to
codify supplemental jurisdiction as it stood by means of § 1367.°8
The committee reports associated with § 1367 show that Congress'
intent in passing the statute was to codify the rules of law set
forth in Gibbs, Zahn, and Owen.' According to the aforemen-
tioned House report, Congress' intent in passing § 1367(a) was to
codify the broad holding in Gibbs by allowing supplemental juris-
diction to extend to any claims that are part of the same case or
controversy as a claim that the court has original jurisdiction
over.
110
The report also stated that the exceptions found within subsec-
tion (b) were intended to prevent the circumvention of the diver-
sity jurisdiction requirements and uphold Owen and Zahn."' The
first set of subsection (b) exceptions codify Owen, as it prevents
claims from current plaintiffs against additional defendants who
do not meet § 1332's requirements."' Further, according to the
House report, the second set of exceptions was in place to codify
Zahn, as it prevents claims from additional plaintiffs who destroy
§ 1332's requirements over current defendants.
1 3
While Congress' attempt to codify Owen was apparently effec-
tive, their attempt to codify Zahn was somewhat more trouble-
some." 4 For whatever reason, Congress did not include claims by
105. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301. "Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy
the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the case."
Id.
106. Owen, 437 U.S. at 377.
107. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2619.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2625. This report explained that the purpose of § 1367 was to codify the
common law rules surrounding supplemental jurisdiction as they stood in 1990. H. R. REP.
No. 101-734.
110. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2625 (citing H. R. REP. No. 101-734).
111. The House report stated that § 1367(b) "is not intended to affect the jurisdictional
requirements of [§ 13321 in diversity-only class actions, as those requirements were inter-
preted prior to [this statute]." H. R. REP. No. 101-734.
112. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2625. The first set of exceptions bar "claims by plaintiffs
against persons made parties under Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
113. H. R. REP. No. 101-734.
114. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2626.
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persons joined under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in their second set of subsection (b) exceptions."' Therefore,
it still remained questionable as to whether supplemental jurisdic-
tion could attach to claims from class action plaintiffs that did not
meet the amount in controversy requirement.116 Since the stat-
ute's enactment, eleven of the twelve federal courts of appeal have
decided the issue, with varying results."7
The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Elev-
enth Circuits have held that § 1367 extends supplemental juris-
diction over claims from class members who do not meet the
amount in controversy requirement, so long as the district court
has original jurisdiction over at least one claim. 8 The Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held the same; how-
ever, those circuits limited the grant of jurisdiction to the claims of
unnamed class members only.' 9 The Courts of Appeals for the
First, Third, Eighth and Tenth Circuits have taken a different ap-
proach, holding that original jurisdiction is lacking if a single
plaintiffs claim does not meet the amount in controversy require-
ment. 20
After a plain-text reading of § 1367, there is no doubt that the
statute confers supplemental jurisdiction over all additional
claims in subsection (a), 2' yet in subsection (b), does not exclude
claims from Rule 23 class action plaintiffs. Whether this was an
oversight by the legislature or an intentional act is a moot point.
As Justice Kennedy pointed out, it is the Court's job to apply the
applicable law, and when the law is unequivocal and unambigu-
ous, the Court may not read inferences into the law or refer to ex-
trinsic materials.'2 2 Committee and House reports may only act as
evidence of the legislature's intent, as they are not laws.
115. Id. at 2620 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b)).
116. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2615. "The question has divided the courts of appeals, and we
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict." Id.
117. Id. at 2616.
118. Id. See Olden v. La Farge Corp., 383 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2004); Allapattah, 333 F.3d
at 5458; Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001); In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997); Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v.
Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996).
119. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2616. See Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927 (9th Cir.
2001); In re Abbot Labs, 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995).
120. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2616. See Ortega, 370 F.3d at 124; Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232
F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000); Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 166 F.3d 214
(3d Cir. 1999); Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631 (10th Cir. 1998).
121. This refers to all additional claims that form a part of the same case or controversy
as a claim properly before the court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
122. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2625.
Summer 2006
Duquesne Law Review
Justice Kennedy gave two reasons why legislative history
should not be consulted, both of which are persuasive.123 First, he
likened using a statute's legislative history to resolve its ambigu-
ity to using gasoline to put out a fire, as legislative history is often
ambiguous itself.124 The legislative history of § 1367, for example,
consists of several years worth of studies and reports, many of
which contain contradictory text and terminology.' Legislative
history should be a last resort because it is often murky itself.
Justice Kennedy also stated that giving credence to legislative
history could give those with no say in the enactment a means to
push their agenda. Unrepresented committee members, un-
elected staffers, and lobbyists could all find their opinions floating
in committee and House reports. 27 These individuals could poten-
tially amend a statute by use of a committee report if a court were
to adopt their view.128 This would pose a serious threat to Article I
of the Constitution, as the lawmaking power is expressly conferred
to Congress alone. 29
If courts defer to legislative history when a statute is not am-
biguous, committee and House reports would become analogous to
statutes and bills. Making statutory amendments is a detailed
process that requires approval from the House of Representatives,
the Senate, and the President. Courts must not allow the legisla-
ture to bypass these requirements by putting materials analogous
to statutory provisions in their committee reports. Giving statutes
and other legislative enactments a plain-text reading will instead
encourage congressmen to draft clear and unambiguous rules.
Legislative history can be a useful interpretative tool, but it is a
tool that can easily be abused; therefore, courts should only defer
to it when absolutely necessary.
Finally, as Justice Scalia stated in Finley v. United States,3 °
"[wihatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by
123. Id. at 2626.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2626-27.
126. Id.
127. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2626.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2627. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 1.
130. 490 U.S. 545, 557 (1989). In Finley, the Supreme Court was faced with a statutory
construction problem with regards to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1987), which granted plaintiffs
asserting claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act original federal jurisdiction. Finley,
490 U.S. at 546.
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a particular statute can of course be changed by Congress. 1 3' The
Exxon opinion should send a message to Congress that it ought to
draft statutes more carefully. While it is apparent that § 1367
does not read as Congress intended it to be read, the proper re-
course was not for the Court to read language into the statute that
did not exist. Our Constitution requires the courts to apply the
law as it is written by the legislature. To do otherwise would be
repugnant to Article I.
Salvatore Joseph Bauccio
131. Id. at 556.
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